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LEE v. WEISMAN: AMATEUR PSYCHOLOGY




"[I]nterior decorating is a rock hard science compared to psychology
practiced by amateurs."' So reads Justice Scalia's stinging dissent in Lee
v. Weisman.2 The majority opinion in Lee, authored by Justice Kennedy,
concludes that the state's use of psychological peer pressure to coerce
students into participating in a graduation benediction prayer violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.' The majority relied
upon three psychological studies that examined the effect of peer pres-
sure on adolescent behavior to reach this conclusion.4 While admitting
reliance on these studies, the majority gave no indication of the specific
conclusions each study supported, merely stating that "[r]esearch in psy-
chology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often sus-
ceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the
influence is strongest in matters of social convention."5 Is Justice Scalia
correct in stating that this use of psychology is amateurish, or is its use an
adequate presentation of the modern, prevailing. theories of adolescent
psychology as the majority contends?
How is a judge to evaluate social science or psychological data to deter-
mine both its authority in describing human behavior and its relevance to
the legal inquiry? Presently, courts have little guidance in determining
the probative value of scientific evidence because the use of psychological
1. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2681 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
3. Id. at 2661. Since it decided Lee in June of 1992, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to consider a Fifth Circuit case upholding the constitutionality of a graduation
benediction read by a student. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
4. See Clay V. Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-Peer Cross-Pressures, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 385 (1963); B. Bradford Brown, et al., Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Con-
formity Dispositions, and Self Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 521 (1986) [hereinafter Perceptions]; Donna Rae Clasen & B. Bradford Brown,
The Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in Adolescence, 14 J. YouTH & ADOLESCENCE
451 (1985).
5. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2659.
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evidence is treated as a factual inquiry.6 John Monahan and Laurens
Walker, Professors of Law at the University of Virginia, argue that social
science evidence should be treated as authority similar to legal precedent,
and have developed a framework that provides guidance for evaluating
the relevance of psychological data in the legal context.7 An examination
of the psychological evidence that the Court applied in Lee under the
Monahan-Walker criteria suggests that the majority's statement regarding
peer pressure is generally supported: peer pressure does has a significant
impact upon adolescent social development. However, the majority's
conclusion is an overly simplistic description of the psychological consen-
sus. Some evidence suggests that by the time adolescents graduate from
high school, the influence of peer pressure is declining. At this stage,
adolescents are more confident in their beliefs and individuality than the
majority opinion suggests. In addition, the debate within the field of psy-
chology over the characteristics of adolescent cognitive and social devel-
opment continues.' In light of these factors, the majority's use of
evidence from a discipline that is in a continuing state of discovery is
questionable, especially when alternative legal arguments exist to support
Lee's ruling that a graduation benediction violates the Establishment
Clause.9
This Note begins by examining the history of Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence of the Supreme Court. Then this Note will examine the ma-
jority opinion in Lee, as well as rationales offered in the concurring
opinions of Justices Blackmun and Souter, and the dissent of Justice
Scalia. This Note then briefly examines the ways in which social science
may be used in judicial proceedings. This Note then examines the system
Monahan and Walker suggest for evaluating social authority, Finally, this
Note looks at the psychological evidence used in Lee v. Weisman within
the Monahan and Walker framework and evaluates whether or not the
evidence should be considered authoritative.
6. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478 (1986).
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. See Lawrence F. Rossow & Nancy
D. Rossow, Student Initiated Religious Activity: Constitutionality Argument or Psychologi-
cal Inquiry, 19 J. LAW & EDuc. 207, 212-16 (1990); Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of
Student-Initiated Religious Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 507-09 (1983)
(These two articles disagree with each other on the correct application of psychological
evidence in the context of student-initiated prayer).
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2661 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND Lee v. Weisman
A. The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court first examined the validity of state law under the
Establishment Clause in 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education.10 Writ-
ing for the Court Justice Black stated: "In the words of Thomas Jeffer-
son, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect 'a wall of separation between church and state.""' Thus, the Court
concluded that a state or the federal government may not pass laws that
aid a specific religion, that assist all religions in general, or that give pref-
erential treatment to one religious sect to the detriment of another.'2 In
addition, the federal government or a state may not "openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa."'
13
In 1962, the Court first examined the constitutionality of prayer in pub-
lic schools in Engel v. Vitale. 4 The Court considered the constitutionality
of a short prayer prepared by the New York State Board of Regents to be
read aloud daily in public schools.'" The Court concluded that school
prayer was "inconsistent both with the purposes of the Establishment
Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself." 6 The articulated pur-
poses of the Establishment Clause were the protection of religious pri-
vacy and the awareness that "governmentally established religions and
religious persecutions go hand in hand."' 7
A year after the Engel decision, the Supreme Court, in Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp,18 invalidated the Baltimore, Maryland public
school practice of beginning the school day with a reading from the Bible
or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer.' 9 The Schempp Court announced a
test to determine whether a law regarding prayer in public schools vio-
lated the Establishment Clause.2" The Court stated that if either the pur-
pose or the primary effect of the statute is the advancement or inhibition
10. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11. Id. at 16.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 16. The Court gave six examples of conduct prohibited by the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 15-16.
14. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
15. Id. at 423-25.
16. Id. at 433.
17. Id. at 432.
18. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
19. Id. at 222.
20. Id. at 223.
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of religion, then the law goes beyond the legislature's constitutional
power.21 Because the Court felt that prayer and reading from the Bible
advanced religion, the practices were deemed unconstitutional.22
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger derived a three-part test from the Court's
previous decisions to determine whether the government action violated
the Establishment Clause.23 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,24 the Court held
that government action is constitutional under the Establishment Clause
if three conditions are met: "First, the statute must have a "secular legis-
lative purpose;" second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... finally, the statute cannot pro-
duce, 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' ''25 Since




22. Id. The Court reaffirmed this test in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968), holding that an Arkansas statute preventing the teaching of evolution violated the
Establishment Clause. The Epperson Court stated that: "[government] may not aid, fos-
ter, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant
opposite." Id. at 104.
23. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
24. Id.
25. Id. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (addressing the third prong
of the Lemon test). The origin of the third element of the Lemon test has been traced to
Everson v. Board of Educ., where the Court stated that: "[n]either a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 16.
26. Between 1971 and 1992 the Supreme Court decided thirty-one Establishment
Clause cases. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2663 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring),
In applying the Lemon test, the Court has devoted considerable attention to the question
of whether a governmental action has the purpose or effect of promoting religion, or
whether it has "endorsed" religion. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592
(1989). In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Court concluded, "whenever the State
itself speaks on a religious subject, one of the questions that we must ask is 'whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion."' Id.
The Court has usually spoken of "favoritism," "endorsement," or "preference" of religion
when discussing prohibited conduct. See, e.g., Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("government may not favor religious belief over disbe-
lief" or propound a "preference for the dissemination of religious ideas... "); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (a "preference" for specific religious beliefs constitutes
an endorsement of religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (the Establishment Clause "precludefs] government from conveying or attempting
to convey a message that religions or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.");
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (endorsement is closely associated with pro-
motion); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (the government "may not ...
promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant oppo-
site"); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concur-
Lee v. Weisman
In one Establishment Clause case the Supreme Court based its decision
on a rationale other than the Lemon test principles.27 In Marsh v. Cham-
bers,' the Court held that the practice of the Nebraska legislature of
opening each day with a prayer led by a state salaried chaplain did not
violate the Establishment Clause.29 The Court sidestepped the Lemon
analysis and upheld the practice on the basis of the long standing tradi-
tion of opening legislative sessions with a prayer.30 The Court reasoned
that a similar congressional practice continued unceasingly since the
United States Congress first convened.31 The Court stated that it would
be inappropriate to construe the First Amendment to place greater re-
strictions upon the states than the federal government.32 The Court
stressed that the first Congress carefully considered whether this practice
should be allowed.33 The Court further stated, "the delegates did not
consider opening prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically
placing the government's 'official seal of approval on one religious view
".. '3' Finally, the Marsh Court concluded that members of the legisla-
ture are adults, "not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination ... or
peer pressure ....
B. Lee v. Weisman
In June of 1989, Deborah Weisman graduated from Nathan Bishop
Middle School in Providence, Rhode Island, a public school. 36 At the
time she was 14 years old.37 The policy of the Superintendent of Schools
allowed principals to invite clergy to give invocations and benedictions at
high school and middle school graduations. 38 The principal of Nathan
Bishop Middle School invited Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to conduct the
invocation for Ms. Weisman's graduation. The principal gave Rabbi Gut-
terman a handbook entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions," which
ring) ("The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that the government...
effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion.").
27. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 784.
30. Id. at 795.
31. Id. at 786-92.
32. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
33. Id. at 790-91.
34. Id. at 792.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
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stated that the prayers should be nonsectarian and sensitive to other reli-
gious beliefs.39 The principal also personally advised Rabbi Gutterman
that the prayers should be nonsectarian.40
Ms. Weisman and her father, Daniel Weisman, sought a temporary re-
straining order to prevent the inclusion of either an invocation or bene-
diction in the graduation ceremony.4' The district court denied the
motion because it lacked adequate time to consider it.42 After the cere-
mony, Daniel Weisman sought to permanently enjoin the school from in-
cluding prayers in -future graduation ceremonies.43 The district court
granted the injunction," and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.45 The school board appealed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.46
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that public high school
and middle school graduation prayers are unconstitutional. 47 Without re-
considering the Court's prior holdings, Justice Kennedy concluded that:
"it is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion
or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] reli-
gion or religious faith or tends to do so."''48 After addressing the liberty
interests protected by the Establishment Clause, Justice Kennedy stated
39. Id.
40. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2649.
41. Id. at 2654.
42. Id.
43. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990).
44. Id. at 73. Applying the Lemon test, the district court concluded that invocations
and benedictions at graduation ceremonies, even those which are nonsectarian, identify
government power with religious practice in general, thereby endorsing religion. The dis-
trict court concluded that this violates the second prong of the Lemon test. Id. The district
court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's decision in, Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822
F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987), which held that benedictions at public school graduations are not
per se unconstitutional, and concluded that the Marsh decision could not be extended to
graduation ceremonies at public schools. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D.R.I.
1990).
45. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and
adopted it without alteration. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990).
46. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
47. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
48. Id. at 2655 (brackets in original) (citations omitted). The majority opinion's em-
phasis on the coercive element present in the graduation ceremony is not surprising given
the fact that Justice Kennedy is the author. In his dissent in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Justice Kennedy stated:
Our [Establishment Clause] cases disclose two limiting principles: government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise;
and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct
1994] Lee v. Weisman
that in the context of elementary and secondary schools there are addi-
tional important concerns, such as "protect[ing] freedom of conscience
from subtle coercive pressure.,
49
The Court then addressed the possible presence of "subtle coercive
pressure" in the graduation ceremony attended by Deborah Weisman.
The Court concluded that the school's supervision of the ceremony ex-
erted pressure upon the students to consent to the religious exercise by
forcing them to stand or remain silent.50 According to the majority, the
indirect pressure on the students exerted by the school board's control
and the presence of peers is as "real as any overt compulsion."'" The
majority asserted that the Establishment Clause prohibits schools from
making adolescents forego participation in a high school graduation cere-
mony in order to remain free from religious indoctrination.52
The Court then argued that a student's choice in such a situation is not
entirely free.53 The Court cited three psychological studies to support the
assertions that adolescents are "susceptible to pressure from their peers
towards conformity" and "the influence [of peers] is strongest in matters
of social convention."54 The Court concluded that "[t]o recognize that
the choice imposed by the State constitutes an unacceptable constraint
only acknowledges that the government may no more use social pressure
benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith or tends to do so."
Id. at 659. Justice Kennedy further stressed the importance of the coercive element,
stating:
The freedom to worship as one pleases without government interference or op-
pression is the great object of both the Establishment and the Free Exercise
Clauses. Barring all attempts to aid religion through government coercion goes
far toward attainment of this object .... But coercion need not be a direct tax in
aid of religion or a test oath. Symbolic recognition or accommodation of religious
faith may violate the Clause in an extreme case .... Absent coercion, the risk of
infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is
minimal.
Id. at 660-62. Justice Kennedy's questioning during oral arguments in Lee also emphasized
the importance of the coercive element. Justice Kennedy is quoted as stating to Charles J.
Cooper, attorney for the petitioners, "In our culture, graduation is a key event in a young
persons's life .... I find it very difficult to accept the proposition that it is not a substantial
imposition on a young graduate to say that you have your choice: either hear this prayer or
absent yourself from graduation." DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF
THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 454 (1993).
49. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2659-60.
52. Id. at 2660.
-53. Id.
54. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660. See supra, note 4.
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to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means."55 On these
grounds, the majority upheld the permanent injunction barring prayers at
middle and high school graduation ceremonies.
56
The Court refuted petitioner's arguments in favor of the prayers. The
Court concluded that the stipulation that graduation attendance was vol-
untary was "formalistic in the extreme. 5 7 The Court also rejected the
contention that the Marsh rationale was applicable to a graduation bene-
diction. The Court drew three distinctions between Marsh and the pres-
ent case: (1) unlike students, legislators are able to enter and leave as
they please during the prayers; (2) the effect and influence of the formal
graduation exercise are greater than the opening prayer of a legislative
session; and (3) school officials exert a significant degree of control over
the graduation ceremony. 58 The majority observed that in the context of
a state supervised graduation, "the state-imposed character of an invoca-
tion and benediction by clergy selected by the school combine to make
the prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was
left with no alternative but to submit.,
59
The Court, however, could have decided this case on more traditional
rationale. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun concluded that the
graduation prayers were unconstitutional based on a specific application
of the Lemon test.6" Justice Souter also concurred in the judgement, but
relied on an in-depth historical exposition on the development of the Es-
tablishment Clause in concluding that the clause prohibits state support
of religion in general, and not only state endorsement of a specific sect.
61
55. Lee, 112 S.Ct. at 2659.
56. Id. at 2654, 2661.
57. Id.
58. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2663-67. Justice Blackmun first went through a historical analysis of the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. He stated the issue:
The question then is whether the government has "placed its official stamp of
approval" on the prayer .... As the Court ably demonstrates, when the govern-
ment "composes official prayers," selects the member of the clergy to deliver the
prayer, has the prayer delivered at a public school event that is planned, super-
vised and given by school officials, and pressures students to attend and partici-
pate in the prayer, there can be no doubt that the government is advancing and
promoting religion.
Id. at 2664-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun concluded
that the graduation prayer in Lee violated the second prong of the Lemon test, by promot-
ing and advancing religion. Id.
61. Id. at 2667. Justice Souter examined the historical development of the Establish-
ment Clause as it passed through its stages; from Madison's initial proposal through the
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Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that graduation prayers similar to those
given by Rabbi Gutterman have been readily accepted throughout the
history of the nation.62 Justice Scalia strongly criticized the majority's use
of psychological data, stating that, "[t]he deeper flaw in the Court's opin-
ion does not lie in its wrong answer to the question whether there was
state-induced 'peer-pressure' coercion; it lies, rather, in the Court's mak-
ing violation of the Establishment Clause hinge on such a precious
question."
63
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court first used social science evidence in Muller v. Ore-
gon in 1908. 4 Despite some criticism, this evidentiary practice is gener-
ally accepted by the Supreme Court justices.
65
Typically, courts treat the examination of social science data as a fac-
tual inquiry.66 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the classicalist
drafts of the congressional committees and finally its adopted form. Justice Souter ob-
served of the Clause's language, "Implicit in their choice is the distinction between prefer-
ential and nonpreferential establishments, which the weight of evidence suggests the
Framers appreciated." Id. at 2671. "If the Framers had wished, for some reason, to use the
indefinite term to achieve a narrow meaning for the Clause, they could far more aptly have
placed it before the word 'religion."' Id. at 2670. Justice Souter concludes that the Fram-
ers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit both preferential and nonpreferential
establishments, policies which encourage the growth of particular sects as well as religion
in general. Id. at 2669-76.
62. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 2683.
64. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
65. At the time Lee was decided, at least seven of the nine Justices of the Supreme
Court had either authored or joined decisions which used social scientific research. See
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2826-29 (1992)
(O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (citing psychological evidence of the battered women's
syndrome to support the conclusion that fear of psychological and physical abuse creates
an unduly burdensome statutory framework that forces women to notify their husbands of
the intention to have an abortion); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984)
(White, J.) (citing sociological field research as partial support for an exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule based upon "good faith"); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 921 n.12 (1983) (Blackmun, J.) (using psychological and psychiatric evidence to
support the argument that a state statute justifying capital punishment to prevent continu-
ing violence is unconstitutional); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519, 525 n.6 (1983) (Rehn-
quist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (citing sociological surveys supporting the use of a "drug
courier profile" in establishing reasonable suspicion for searches); Mississippi Univer. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727-31 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (citing sociological evidence
in arguing that a state statute excluding males from enrolling in a state-supported nursing
school violates the Equal Protection Clause).
66. Monahan & Walker, supra note 6, at 479-82.
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distinction between law and fact dominated.67 James Bradley Thayer
provided an authoritative description of the rigid distinction between law
and fact: questions of law include only the process of choosing among
competing rules, while all other questions are defined as questions of
fact.6 8 Louis Brandeis used this distinction when preparing a brief heav-
ily relying on sociological evidence for the Court in Muller.69 By the
nineteen thirties, most courts accepted the practice of treating social sci-
ence evidence as fact.
70
A question remained, however, regarding judicial notice of social sci-
ence facts: if social science evidence is factual evidence, how could any
court use social science without first holding an adversarial hearing as
required by classical jurisprudence and traditional notions of due pro-
cess? 7 1 In 1942, Kenneth Culp Davis advocated a shift away from the
rigid nature of formalistic classicalism's notion of jurisprudence. 72 Davis
proposed a distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative facts.73
Davis asserted that adjudicative facts are facts specifically pertaining to
the case before the court, while legislative facts are facts used in deciding
questions of policy and law.74 Davis reasoned that courts should have
greater freedom to consider relevant facts when forming a rule of law
than when examining the particular adjudicative facts of a specific case.75
Davis' distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts became
widely accepted by American courts, and was incorporated into the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.76 Thereafter, social science evidence has consist-
67. Id. at 479.
68. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 182-262 (1898).
69. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How rr Is 209-
10 (1987).
70. Monahan & Walker, supra note 6, at 481.
71. Id. at 481-82.
72. Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems in Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 44 HARV. L. REV. 364,424 (1942); see also FED. R. EvID. 201(a) advisory commit-
tee's note.
73. Id. at 425.
74. Id. at 424.
75. Regarding legislative facts, Davis states:
My opinion is that judge-made law would stop growing if judges, in thinking
about questions of law and policy, were forbidden to take into account the facts
they believe, as distinguished from facts which are "clearly ... within the domain
of indisputable." Facts most needed in thinking about difficult problems of law
and policy have a way of being outside the domain of the clearly indisputable.
Kenneth C. Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PER-
SPECTIVES OF LAW 68, 83 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1964).
76. To take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact, however, the Federal Rules of Evi-
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ently been used as legislative fact. 7
Critics of the judicial use of social science evidence as legislative fact
argue that systematic guidance is lacking as to how the evidence should
be treated and evaluated. 78 No guidance is given as to whether the facts
should be submitted by brief or by expert testimony.79 Professors
Monahan and Walker state that, "the distinction between legislative and
adjudicative fact leaves Courts perplexed as to how they should obtain
dence require the fact to be generally undisputed. FED. R. EVID. 201(b). In addition, the
advisory committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence stated that judicial access to legisla-
tive facts should be the same as suggested by Professor Morgan regarding facts in domestic
law.
In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge is
unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject the propositions
of either parties or of both parties. He may consult the sources of pertinent data
to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an independent
search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has or what the parties
present ... [Tihe parties do no more than to assist; they control no part of the
process.
Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1944), reprinted in FED. R. EVID.
201(a) advisory committee's note.
Nonetheless, there has been substantial criticism of the distinction between legislative
facts and adjudicative facts. See, e.g., Brice M. Claggett, Informal Action-Adjudication-
Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L. J.
51, 80 (1971); Thomas 0. McGarrity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administra-
tive Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67
GEO. L.J. 729, 767 (1979); Arthur S. Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61
VA. L. REV. 1187, 1234 n.120 (1975); Glenn 0. Robinson, The Making of Administrative
Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Re-
form, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 536 (1970).
77. Monahan & Walker, supra note 6, at 483-84, 487 n.35. But cf Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (holding that school segregation violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by psychologically injuring African-American students, and referring to social
scientific evidence as "modem authority," rather than fact). Id. at 494. The Brown Court
listed the studies in a footnote much as a list of.cases would have been inserted to support
the proposition. Id. at 494 n.11. The Court's reference was roundly criticized. See, e.g.,
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
33 (1959); Edmund Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-58 (1955).
78. Monahan & Walker, supra note 6, at 485-488.
79. FED. R. EvID. 201(a) advisory committee's note (indicating that there is no rule
dealing with judicial notice of legislative facts). "The most serious problem with Rule 201
may be its total failure to address legislative facts." STEPHEN A SALTZBURG & MICHAEL
M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 43 (3d ed. 1982). See also Kenneth
C. Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1980) (observing that when a
judge takes judicial notice of legislative facts, opposing counsel has no opportunity to re-
spond to the assertions). Davis proposes giving the opposing counsel notice of the court's
intention to take judicial cognizance of certain facts and allowing counsel to present con-
trary evidence. However, no cross-examination would be allowed. Id. at 935.
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social research, the distinction provides no direction at all concerning
either how courts should evaluate the information they do obtain or how
they should treat prior judicial consideration of that material."8 None-
theless, one suggested justification, albeit a cynical one, is convenience.8'
"Tribunals make factual assumptions because it is convenient to do so."
82
Professors Monahan and Walker argue that social science research is
more appropriately treated as authority than fact when forming a rule of
law.83 They support this assertion by comparing the qualities inherent to
both social science and the law. One quality shared by law and social
science is in generality. 84 Both law and science are general because they
are both concerned with normative principles of human behavior, with
how humans normally act and how they should act.85 Law and social
science research are also similar because they both address future human
conduct as well as present behavior.86 Psychological and social science
research maintains its generality when used to form a rule of law, because
the psychological evidence is concerned with the larger realm of human
80. Walker & Monahan, supra note 6, at 487.
81. Id. at 487.
82. Davis, supra note 75, at 93.
83. Id. at 489-91.
84. Legal precedent is generally based on the circumstances of the case decided. Yet
legal precedent often sweeps farther than the particular circumstances of the original dis-
pute. "It is this attribute of generality that is described as the 'precedential effect' or au-
thoritative nature of a court decision." Id. at 491. See generally R. CRoss, PRECEDENT IN
ENGLISH LAW (1961) (describing the role of precedent, and how it is applied in English
common law).
Although it may make specific empirical findings, social science research as a rule is not
so concerned with how specific individuals behave, but with how individuals and social
groups behave. Social sciences merely generalizes and describes human behavior after
studying a specific social group. The goal of such research is to understand human behav-
ioral norms. "Because of this generality, the conclusions of empirical research are some-
times metaphorically described as scientific laws." Monahan & Walker, supra note 6, at
490.
85. Monahan and Walker, supra note 6, at 490-91.
86. Professors Monahan and Walker state:
Scientific findings are evaluated in part by their heuristic value - by their ability to
order and make understandable new phenomena. Likewise, a court decision
comes to be accorded the status of precedent when it is found to embody a princi-
ple that assists in the resolution of a subsequent conflict. In both cases, the risk of
strategic bias is reduced, since investigators or judges could not have anticipated
all the applications that would be found for their work in the future. The general
applicability of both common-law precedent and much of social research is aug-
mented by the fact that, at the time the research is conducted or the decision is
rendered, the ultimate implications can be only dimly foreseen, if foreseen at all.
Id. at 491.
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behavior-future and present-and not with a purely limited social
phenomenon.8 7
III. THE MONAHAN AND WALKER FACrORS
Professors Monahan and Walker suggest a framework to examine the
authoritative weight of social science evidence."8 In order to consider so-
cial science evidence as authority the following must be true: (1) the evi-
dence must have survived the critical review of the scientific community;
(2) valid research methods must have been used; (3) the evidence must be
generalizable"9 (applicable) to the case at issue; and (4) the evidence
must be supported by a body of other research.90
A. Critical Review
9 1
According to Monahan and Walker, a study has survived the critical
review of the scientific community when there has been an opportunity
for other scientists to review the findings of the research. 2 This review
often occurs prior to the publication of the research.93 Before the re-
search is published in a refereed journal,94 several scientists review the
findings for scientific merit to screen out assertions which are unsup-
ported by empirical data.95 Other methods by which research may be
87. Id.
88. Id. at 499.
89. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. Generalizability in its simplest sense
connotes the applicability of the research to the context in which the scientific research is
to be understood and applied. It connotes some parallel applicability. Monahan &
Walker, supra note 6, at 505-07. For example, for the research cited to in Lee to be gener-
alizable, the research must be broad enough to be applied accurately in the social context
of a graduation ceremony. It must take into account the very stimuli and factors which the
adolescents will be experiencing in the graduation environment. For simplicity, this con-
cept will hereinafter be referred to as "applicability" or "applicable" and not
"generalizability."
90. Monahan and Walker, supra note 6, at 499.
91. These subheadings parallel the framework suggested by Professors Monahan and
Walker. Id.
92. Id. at 499-500.
93. Id. at 500.
94. Monahan and Walker, supra note 6, at 500-05.
95. Id. Regarding the weight of research published in a refereed journal, Monahan
and Walker state:
Upon seeing a report in a refereed journal, for example, a social scientist, without
reading the study, will at least know that several disinterested social scientists,
chosen largely for their own scientific accomplishments, have reviewed the re-
search and found it worthy of publication.
Id. at 500.
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reviewed include comprehensive evaluations by federal agencies that
fund the research, critical reviews in scholarly journals,96 and literature
reviews that examine and summarize scientific findings on a specific sub-
ject.97 Organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences often ap-
point panels to produce an evaluation of current research.98 The more
extensive a review the research has received, the greater weight it should
be accorded.99
B. Valid Research Methods
Social science research must be the product of a valid research method
to be considered authoritative. Four commonly used methods in social
science research are case studies, correlational designs, quasi-experi-
ments, and true experiments.100 Case studies are generally considered
the most unreliable research method because they involve studies of spe-
cific occurrences, and their in-depth analyses provide little substantive
description of the general population.1' Correlational designs attempt to
use statistical analysis to establish the cause and effect relationship be-
tween two factors, such as a study of the correlation between smoking
and lung cancer.102 A quasi-experiment is a research experiment in
which assignments are not given randomly.0 3 An example of this re-
search method is the time series experiment, wherein a certain factor is
measured at specific time intervals.1 0 4 The true experiment randomly as-
signs participants to the conditions being studied. 0 5 True experiments
96. Id. at 501.
97. Id.
98. Monahan and Walker, supra note 6, at 501.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 503-04.
101. Case studies are common in biographies and journalism. Id. at 504.
102. Correlational studies have been frequently used in employment discrimination
cases to determine whether higher scores on employment tests actually relate to job per-
formance. Id. Such studies are also used in death penalty cases to assess the defined effect
of the death penalty. See, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1967); Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 345-54 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurring) (citing a correlational study ex-
amining the effect of the death penalty on the murder rate); See generally, D. BARNES,
STATISTICS AS PROOF 231-91 (1983).
103. Monahan & Walker, supra note 6, at 504.
104. A test using this method would, for example, conduct an analysis of breathalyzer
use and the rate of accidents at specific time intervals in order to determine the effect of
the crackdown on the rate of traffic accidents. See Ross, Law, Science and Accidents: The
British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20-35 (1973).
105. Random assignments in true experiments are important because they assure to the
extent possible that the findings are a result of the studied condition and not other already
existing conditions or differences between groups. See, e.g., DONALD T. CAMPBELL AND
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are considered the most valuable research method because they minimize
conditions that may undermine research validity.
1' 6
C. Applicable Findings
Social science research is more authoritative when the research condi-
tions are sufficiently applicable and parallel to the situation to which the
study results must subsequently be applied.0 7 According to Monahan
and Walker, in order to assess applicability of a study to a specific situa-
tion three elements of the study must be examined: the applicability of
the study to the persons, settings, and time.' 08 A study is considered to
be applicable between persons if there is sufficient similarity between the
persons in the study and the persons to which the findings are applied. 0 9
A study is considered to be applicable between settings where there is a
sufficient similarity between the research setting and the setting to which
the findings are to be applied." 0 A study is considered applicable across
time where enough time has not passed to render the findings
JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH
at 13-14 (1963).
106. Some situations which may compromise iesearch validity are selection bias, his-
tory, and maturation. Selection bias occurs where the causal link between the attributes
studied may be due to a factor other than the theory sought to be validated. "A research
project that assessed the effects of a new pre-trial conference procedure by comparing the
settlement rate in ten courts that volunteered for the new procedure with the settlement
rate in ten courts that did not volunteer could be criticized for selection bias." Monahan
and Walker, supra note 6, at 503. History is anything that occurs during the research which
might bias or skew the findings. Id. Maturation can affect long term studies, where the
results could be a factor of the subjects growing older and not due to the element being
studied. Id.
A true experiment is preferable because it controls all the extraneous variables present
in the study, allowing the researcher to attribute the observed effects to the independent
variable. See, LARRY B. CHRISTENSEN, EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY (1988). True ex-
periments control both the independent and extraneous variables. In the context of studies
examining peer pressure, the researcher may control the direction of the peer pressure in
the study by wording survey questions differently. See infra notes 122-27, 149-57, 178-82
and accompanying text. Extraneous variables may be controlled by eliminating them,
maintaining the variables at a constant level, by balancing the conditions so they effect the
control group and study group equally, by counterbalancing (allowing the condition to be
experienced an equal number of times for both groups) or by randomizing the effect of the
variables and allowing the law of averages to factor in. The studies utilized in Lee used the
last approach. F. J. McGUIGAN, EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: METHODS OF RESEARCH
74 (6th ed. 1993).
107. Monahan & Walker, supra note 6, at 506.
108. Id. at 506-07.
109. Id. at 506.
110. Id. at 507.
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outdated."'
D. Supported by Other Research
The more often researchers replicate the findings of a specific research
study, the greater the likelihood that the study adequately represents
human behavior, and thus the more weight the study should be ac-
corded." 2 While this factor in determining authoritativeness is the most
easily understood, it is the most important.
IV. LEE V. WEISMAm THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
The majority in Lee used three psychological studies to support the
propositions that teenagers are susceptible to peer pressure and that peer
pressure influences students in middle and high schools to the extent that
their choice cannot be considered free.' 3 These studies were: Clay V.
Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-Peer Cross-Pressures;"4 Donna
Rae Clasen & B. Bradford Brown, The Multidimensionality of Peer Pres-
sure in Adolescence;"5 and B. Bradford Brown, et al., Perceptions of Peer
Pressure, Peer Conformity Dispositions, and Self Reported Behavior
Among Adolescents." 6
In order to determine if these studies support the conclusion in Lee,
this Note will examine each of these studies under the Monahan and
Walker framework. First, this Note will explain the general conclusions
found by each particular study. Then this Note will examine whether: (1)
the study has survived the critical review of the scientific community; (2)
the research method of the study is adequate; (3) the study is applicable
to the situation in Lee, (4) the research has been supported by findings of
other scientific inquiries.
A. Adolescent Choices and Parent-Peer Cross Pressures
This study (hereinafter "Cross-Pressure") examined situations in which
adolescents were subjected to conflicting peer and parental pressures. It
111. Id.
112. Id. at 508.
113. See supra, note 4 and accompanying text.
114. Clay V. Brittain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-Peer Cross-Pressures, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 385 (1963).
115. Donna Rae Clasen & B. Bradford Brown, The Multidimensionality of Peer Pres-
sure in Adolescence, 14 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 451 (1985).
116. B. Bradford Brown et al., Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity Disposi-
tions, and Self Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22 DEV. PSYCHOL. 521 (1986).
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attempted to discern the extent to which the teenager's choices were in-
fluenced by the particular situation involved." 7 The Cross-Pressure
study found that the responses of adolescents placed under conflicting
peer-parent pressures was a function of the content of the alternatives."'
Brittain concluded that "[p]eer-conformity in adolescence, rather than
being diffuse, tends to vary systematically across situations.'""19 Brittain
drew four specific conclusions from the evidence. First, adolescents per-
ceive both parents and peers to be adequate guides within different con-
texts.' 20 Adolescents are more likely to choose the alternative suggested
by a peer when the content of the alternatives relates to peer society,' 2 '
but are more likely to choose the alternative suggested by a parent when
the content of the alternatives pertains to society at large.' 2 In the latter
situation, parents are viewed by adolescents as the more appropriate and
competent guides.' 23 Second, adolescents are concerned with appearing
different from their peers, particularly in areas of social convention such
as clothing appearance and dating. 124 Third, adolescents are concerned
with being separated from their friends."2 Fourth, the choices ultimately
made by the adolescent reflect which group she relates to in a given situa-
tion, her parents or her peers.
26
This study has survived the critical review of the psychological commu-
nity. It was published in the American Sociological Review, a refereed
journal for the American Sociological Association. The study has also
been readily cited by other researchers.
27
The research method used in the Cross-Pressure study was adequate
because it utilized a random sampling of adolescent high school students
across several locations using multiple tests. The only non-random factor
was that the subjects were all female. The subjects were 280 girls from
Alabama and Georgia. 128 These subjects were drawn from an urban high
school, a high school located in a small city, and three small rural high.' 29
117. Brittain, supra note 4, at 389-90.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 389.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 390-91.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 389.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Clasen & Brown, supra note 4, at 453.
128. Brittain, supra note 4, at 387.
129. Id.
19941
530 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:513
Fifty-eight control subjects were drawn from a high school in a small town
and a rural high school.'13 The subjects were tested on two separate oc-
casions with two different survey forms describing in detail situations in-
volving parent and peer conflict over decisions. 3' The survey form asked
twelve questions involving various social situations where students were
given the option of choosing parental or peer advice.'32 The subjects had
to decide between the two alternatives presented. 33
Although the Cross-Pressure study has survived the critical review pro-
cess and the research methods appear to be valid, there is some doubt
about its applicability to Lee. Because the study used only female sub-
jects, it may not be applicable across persons.134 Other research indicates
that the effect of peer pressure may vary between the sexes. 135 The evi-
dence may not be applicable-to the specific issue presented in Lee v. Weis-
man: whether the school sponsorship of a graduation prayer combined
with peer pressure coerced students into participating in a religious exer-
cise. 136 While the Cross-Pressure study demonstrates that peer pressure
is a dynamic force, it does not necessarily support the Court's conclusion
that peer pressure is coercive under the circumstances of the case.
Whether or not it is advisable to dissent from a public display of religious
belief may be considered a question concerning society at large, not spe-
cifically the peer society, and the Cross-Pressure study suggests that
under these circumstances the adolescent might be more likely to defer to
parental guidance. 137 The study presents no evidence-to support the con-
clusion that the adolescent would be more likely to perceive the situation
in Lee as implicating peer society more than society in general. 38
Even though the Cross-Pressure study was published thirty years ago,
time does not appear to limit its applicability, because the Cross-Pressure
130. Id.
131. Id. at 385-86. None of the questions addressed the specific issue of drawing atten-
tion to oneself in public or dissenting politically in a public forum. Id. at 388. But the study
did observe that parent conformity was more prevalent in response to dilemmas posing
what were perceived as difficult choices. Id. at 389.
132. Id. at 385-86.
133. Id. at 389.
134. See supra note 107-110 and accompanying text.
135. James S. Coleman, THE ADOLESCENT SOCIETY 30 (1963) (finding that the desire to
be popular among females was higher than in male adolescents); But see, Karl C. Garrison
and Karl C. Garrison, Jr., PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE 204 (7th ed. 1975) [hereinafter
Psychology of Adolescence] (finding males more peer oriented than females).
136. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652.
137. See supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
138. Brittain, supra note 4, at 389-91.
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study is supported by other research. Subsequent research supports the
finding that adolescents are more likely to seek advice from peers regard-
ing the social norms of the peer group, such as clothing and dating, and to
seek parental advice regarding issues of society at large.139 "The main
trend during the adolescent years... is toward a more thorough internal-
ization of parental values, even though there may be considerable
hassling about particular points."' 40
B. The Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in Adolescence
The Clasen and Brown Multidimensionality study concludes that peer
pressure is a significantly less monolithic force than earlier studies sug-
gested.' 4 ' The study found that peer pressure tends to vary in intensity
and direction across the grade levels, and among peer groups and lo-
cales.142 Pressure to involve oneself with peers is relatively strong
throughout adolescence. 43 There is some correlation between the vari-
ous adolescent social groups with which peers identify themselves, and
the nature of the pressure. For example, there are different pressure
levels to misbehave among "jock/popular" groups compared to "druggy/
toughs."'" The Multidimensionality study further concluded that as ado-
lescents mature, pressure to conform to peer norms generally decreased.
However, pressure to conform decreased less across grades with rural ad-
olescents than among urban adolescents. 45 The study also reported that
139. D. E. Hamachek, Development and Dynamics of the Adolescent Self, in UNDER-
STANDING ADOLESCENCE: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 22
(2d ed. J.F. Adams ed., 1976). Subsequent research has also found a larger parental role in
choices when the family relationships have been positive. See B. Bradford Brown, Peer
Groups and Peer Cultures, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 174 (S.
Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliot eds. 1990) [hereinafter Peer Cultures]; W. ANDREW COL-
LINS & STANLEY A. KuczAJ II, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: CHILDHOOD AND ADO-
LESCENCE 605 (1991); L. Larson, The Relative Influence of Parent-Adolescent Effect in
Predicting the Salient Hierarchy Among Youth, 15 PAC. Soc. REV. 83-102 (1972).
140. Hamachek, supra note 139, at 32. B. Bradford Brown states:
Studies of real or hypothetical situations in which parents and peers offered con-
flicting advice indicated that teenagers do not routinely acquiesce to peer pres-
sure. In fact they are more likely to follow adults' [sic] than peers' [sic] advice in
matters affecting their long-term future (for example, college choices or career
planning), and they actually rely on their own judgement more often than that of
either peers or parents.
Peer Cultures, supra note 139, at 174.
141. Clasen & Brown, supra note 4, at 464.
142. Id. at 464.
143. Id.
144. Id. 464.
145. Id. at 463.
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despite a modest gender variation, if any, there were no variations across
groups as to the level of peer involvement and conformity pressures.'
46
All social groups tend to have the same levels of peer pressure to identify
with the social group norms, even though the content of the pressure was
different among the various social groups.'
47
Peer pressure towards misconduct is generally weak, and adolescents
were found to be as likely to report that their friends discouraged miscon-
duct as they were to report that their peers encouraged misconduct. 48
However, the pressure to commit misconduct surprisingly rises as peers
mature.' 49 Clasen and Brown suggest that this may be attributed to in-
creasing identification by adolescents with adult norms.'5 0 Such activity
may very well be perceived as adult behavior by adolescents.' 5 '
The Multidimensionality study has also survived critical review by the
psychological community. The study was published in the Journal of
Youth and Adolescence, a refereed journal, 152 and was also presented at
a biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development in
April of 1985.153
The subjects of this experiment were drawn from a sample of 689 stu-
dents in grades seven through twelve in two midwestern communities.'
5 4
Nearly half of the subjects were drawn from a small semi-rural city, and
the rest were drawn from an urban area.' 55 The subjects were identified
by their peers as belonging to particular major peer group. 56 The groups
were classified as "jock/populars", "druggy/toughs" or "loners.' 157 Stu-
dents were randomly selected from each crowd in equal numbers of
males and females, and eighty-seven percent of those selected completed
the questionnaire.'5 8 The questionnaire was administered in a group set-
ting, and measurements of perceived peer pressure and socioeconomic
status were taken.'5 9 The students rated on a seven point scale the rela-
146. Id.
147. Id. at 464.
148. Id. at 461.
149. Id. at 465.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 465.
152. Id. at 450.
153. Clasen & Brown, supra note 4, at 451.
154. Id. at 454.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 455.
157. Id. at 456.
158. Id. at 457-58.
159. Id.
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tive strength of the perceived pressures in certain situations.
16°
The findings of the Multidimensionality study are applicable to the sit-
uation in Lee v. Weisman. The study is applicable across persons because
in the Multidimensionality study all peer groups and factors were taken
into account: grades, gender, socioeconomic status, and locale.16' The
study is also applicable across settings, because it analyzed pressure in a
variety of situations, including social ones: the predominant setting of the
conflict in Lee.'62 The Multidimensionality Study is applicable across
time because the study was completed only nine years ago.
The study's findings have also been supported by additional research.
Other studies indicate that peer pressure is closely affected by age and
other variables. 63 These studies observe that peer pressure to conform
diminishes between ages fifteen to seventeen. Regarding the relationship
between conformity and age, two commentators note:
By the post-adolescent and early adulthood stages, the individ-
ual has learned that there are both situations which call for con-
formity and those which call for individual action. Thus, he
becomes more confident about his own judgments despite the
disagreement of a unanimous majority. However, since the indi-
vidual in this post-adolescent and young adult stage has exper-
ienced socialization, and since he has at some earlier time
experienced the penalties of nonconformity, he does not attain
the degree of individuality of judgment that is evident in the
pre-socialization stage.' 64
The Multidimensionality study indicates that adolescent pressure to
conform diminishes with age. Applying the study to the majority's con-
clusions in Lee v. Weisman, it is arguable that by the time of graduation
160. Clasen & Brown, supra note 4, at 454-56. The invitation to participate and the
questionnaire procedure were arranged in a manner to prevent the adolescents from asso-
ciating between the two. Id. at 451.
161. Id. at 454-56.
162. Id. at 457. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2653-54.
163. See PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 135, at 206-07 (discussing vari-
ables which affect pressure to conform such as age, social class, and gender); John C. Cole-
man, Friendship and the Peer Group in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT
PSYCHOLOGY 408, 422 (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980). An earlier study found a similar result.
See Phillip R. Costanzo & Marvin E. Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Age Level, 37
CHILD DEV. 967-75 (1966).
164. Costanzo & Shaw, supra note 163, at 973. See also W. ANDREW COLLINS AND
STANLEY A. KIJCZAC, II, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: CHILDHOOD AND ADOLES-
CENCE 603 (1991); Jane B. Landsbaum & Richard H. Willis, Conformity in Early and Late
Adolescence, 4 DEV. PSYCHOL. 334, 335-37 (1971) (finding that conformity increases be-
tween ages seven through nine, peaks at around the age of 13, and declines thereafter).
1994]
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students are much more independent, self-cognizant, and subject to less
pressure to conform. The majority makes no mention of this possibility,
even though the injunction also barred prayer at high school gradua-
tion.'65 If anything, the Multidimensionality study demonstrates that
peer pressure is more complex than originally thought.
C. Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity, Dispositions and
Self Reported Behavior
The third and most complicated study used by the Lee Court was the
Brown, Clasen & Eicher Perceptions study."6 This study examined the
relationship between adolescent willingness to conform to peer pressure,
perceived peer pressure, and reported behavior in terms of peer involve-
ment and misconduct.
167
The Perceptions study found that adolescents are more willing to con-
form in instances that are not antisocial,'168 and this willingness to con-
form increases with age until age fifteen and decreases thereafter. 169 The
study also found that females are less willing to succumb to the pressure
to engage in antisocial behavior than males.' 70 The peer pressure per-
ceived by the adolescents is generally against misconduct, and adoles-
cents perceived more pressure towards peer involvement.171 This
perceived peer pressure to be socially involved also peaked at the age
fifteen, although the trend was weak compared with the trend observed
with willingness to conform. 72 In addition, the Perceptions study found
that pressures towards misconduct increase with age, while perceived an-
tisocial peer pressures show no similar trend.
173
Interactions between perceived peer pressure, willingness to conform,
and self-reported behavior are more complex. For example, the study
found that the stronger the perceived peer pressure is against misconduct,
the more adolescents abstained from such conduct. 174 However, the
study found that this trend could work in reverse.1 75 Some teens are
165. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2651, 2654; see supra note 161 and accompanying text.
166. Perceptions, supra note 4, at 528-29.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 521.
169. Id. at 528-29.
170. Perceptions, supra note 4, at 528-29.
171. Id. at 527.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 529.
174. Perceptions, supra note 4, at 529.
175. Id.
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more likely to misbehave when they perceive peer pressure to do so, es-
pecially the adolescents who are willing to conform to antisocial behav-
ior."" Nonetheless, the Perceptions study concludes that peer pressure is
more "prosocial" than antisocial.'77 Finally, the study suggests that will-
ingness to conform and perceived peer pressure are both independent
and interactive sources of influence on adolescent behavior. 178 "Per-
ceived pressures and conformity dispositions do not appear to follow the
same developmental trajectory across adolescence, nor do they appear
equally salient in different facets of teenagers' lives or among adolescents
in different communities.'
'1 79
The Perceptions study has survived critical review by the psychological
community. The study was published in a refereed journal, Developmen-
tal Psychology, and was presented at the biennial meeting of the Society
for Research in Child Development. 8 '
The experiment was composed of a sample of 1,027 students drawn
from one middle school and one high school in two midwestern commu-
nities.' 8l  One community was a small city with 9,500 residents, while the
other was an urban center with a population of 200,000 residents. 82 Sub-
jects were selected by a random stratifying procedure, which classified the
subjects by grade, gender, and peer group affiliation. 8 3 The test drew up
on three sets of scores: willingness to conform to peers, perceived peer
pressures, and self-reported behavior. The first score measured the
strength of the subject's willingness to conform. .84 The second score as-
sessed the strength of perceived pressure. 85 Self-reported behavior was
measured by asking the subjects how many times within the past month
they had participated in certain behavior.8 6 Two different forms of the




179. Perceptions, supra note 4, at 529.
180. Id. at 521.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 522.
183. Perceptions, supra note 4, at 522-23.
184. Id. Responses were made on a six point scale, ranging from absolutely sure of
conformity, not sure, to absolutely sure of nonconformity.
185. Id. Responses to this inquiry were based on a seven point scale, e.g., some, a lot,
or a little.
186. Id. at 522. Self-reported behavior was assessed on a five point scale, e.g., never,
once or twice, three or four times, etc.
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rooms with various grade levels present. 87 The questionnaires were ad-
ministered in two separate occasions.'88
The Perceptions study is applicable to the factual setting of Lee v. Weis-
man. Like the Multidimensionality study, this study is applicable to the
adolescents participating in the graduation ceremony because the study is
demographically broad and it analyzes the conduct of students in a large
social gathering."l 9 Applicability across time also is not a problem be-
cause the study was completed in 1986.1'
The Perceptions study has generally been supported by other studies
which show that the variation in age of peer willingness to conform is less
marked in perceived peer pressure, which was found to increase until age
fifteen and then decline sharply. 191 The conclusion that adolescents, at
least early in their adolescence, are more willing to accede to peer pres-
sure for positive socialization as opposed to antisocial behavior is sup-
ported by earlier research. 92 However, the finding that males are more
willing to follow peers in antisocial behavior than females remains con-
troversial. 93 In addition, the correlation between perceived peer pres-
sure and conformity dispositions is generally not uniform or constant
across groups, individuals, and communities. Rather, the relationship be-
tween perceived pressure and conformity dispositions varies significantly
among groups and individuals.1 94
D. Summary of Findings and Support for Lee v. Weisman
It is apparent from the three studies cited by the Court in Lee that peer
pressure is more complex than originally anticipated. 95 It is not mono-
187. Id.
188. Id. The second questionnaire was slightly shorter.
189. Id. This study included subjects of both genders and of different socioeconomic
background, locality, and age. Id. at 522. Thus, all the possible types of individuals present
in the graduation invocation in Lee were represented. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2654. This is
unlike the Cross-Pressure study, in which the generalizability was limited by the use of only
female subjects in the study. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. Perceptions, supra
note 4, at 523.
190. Perceptions, supra note 4, at 521.
191. Id. See also T. J. Brendt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Par-
ents, 15 DEV. PSYCHOL. 608, 615-16 (1979) (finding that peer conformity increased and
then decreased, but that the largest variations occurred in the realm of antisocial peer
conformity).
192. Clasen & Brown, supra note 4, at 466.
193. Id. at 465-67; PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 135, at 204.
194. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text; Peer Cultures, supra note 139, at
192; see note 198 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 164, 174-77 and accompanying text.
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lithic, but rather multidimensional and dynamic.' 96 The strength of peer
pressure depends to some degree on its content, prosocial, antisocial, or
mischievous, and to a larger degree on other variables, such as age, gen-
der, social group norms, and the geographic location of the subjects. 9 7
Reaction to peer pressure depends somewhat on whether the issue con-
fronted is perceived by the adolescent as a peer society issue or an issue
involving society at large. In the latter situation, parental advice is more
readily sought and followed.198 The age of the adolescent is a significant
variable. Generally, adolescents experience a decrease in perceived peer
pressure and willingness to conform after the age of fifteen.
The majority in Lee v. Weisman oversimplifies psychological evidence.
Admittedly, adolescents are susceptible to peer pressure to conform, par-
ticularly to pressure towards socialization. 199 However, the majority does
not consider the complexity of psychology, as well as other evidence
showing that adolescent individual identity may be more pronounced by
the time of high school graduation, and perceived peer pressure declines
in late adolescence. In fact, the majority's reliance on social psychology
alone, without examining other fields, such as cognitive psychology, pre-
vents the Court from forming a complete picture of the developing ado-
lescent psyche.2°
196. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 137, 165, 168, 173 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
199. Clasen & Brown, supra note 4, at 453.
200. A great deal of psychological research has been conducted regarding the adoles-
cent's growing sense of identity and intellectual independence. See generally ERIK ERIK-
SON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS 28-30 (1968); Daniel P. Keating, Thinking Processes in
Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 211, 231 (Joseph Adelson ed.,
1980); Jean Piaget, The Intellectual Development of the Adolescent, in ADOLESCENCE 23
(G. Caplan & S. Lebovici eds., 1969). This research into cognitive psychology could pro-
vide a more comprehensive perspective of the adolescent psychology, and thus add a great
deal to the inquiry in Lee. For example, Jean Piaget, one of the first researchers to the
cognitive development of adolescents, found that the thinking process of an adolescent is
different "in kind and not just in degree" from that of a child. See The Constitutional
Dimensions of Student Initiated Religious Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L. J.
500, 508 n.42 (1983) (citing Jean Piaget, The Intellectual Development of the Adolescent, in
ADOLESCENCE 23 (G. Caplan & S. Lebovici eds., 1969)). In late adolescence the sophisti-
cation of the mind is such that the student forms his own ideas, is capable of disagreeing
with his peers, and begins to act independently based on his own beliefs. Jean Piaget, The
Intellectual Development of the Adolescent, in ADOLESCENCE 23 (G. Caplan & S. Lebovici
eds., 1969). Piaget believed that this stage, formal operational thought, is reached at or
about the age of 15. Id. With the onset of formal operational thought the adolescent is
capable of critical inquiry, abstract sophisticated thinking and debate, and no longer be-
lieves in the infallibility of his parents. Id. But see Daniel P. Keating, Thinking Processes
in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 211,231 (Joseph P. Adelson
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Additionally, conclusive evidence of the coercive nature of the pres-
sure is lacking.2°' Is peer pressure pervasive enough to deprive the ado-
lescent of his free will? That peer pressure is sufficiently pervasive to
deprive the adolescent of his free will is not clear from the evidence. Yet,
coercion is the legal basis on which the holding in Lee rests. Indeed,
there is still much debate today over the coercive effect of peer pres-
sure. 202 Many researchers are reevaluating the traditional view of peer
pressure as a monolithic and negative force. 2 3 The contemporary view is
that, despite some of its negative effects, peer influence may be a sup-
portive and positive force that helps adolescents embrace their growing
identity.20 4
ed. 1980) (finding little empirical support for the theory that adolescents develop in distinct
stages, but that cognitive growth appears to be "continuous, quantitative, and multidimen-
sional growth in abilities"). Another psychologist, Erik Erikson, characterized adolescence
as a period of transition from childhood into adult life when the adolescent is engaged in
the process of defining his own existence. ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS
28-30, 156-65, 246-47 (1968). In developing this new identity, the adolescent increasingly
challenges and questions authority figures. Id. "The adolescent is likely to resent authori-
tative control. The self-conscious attitude so clearly displayed at this stage of life marks
him as an individual on the alert, watching for someone to consider him as a child and thus
boss him around." PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE, supra note 135, at 79.
Furthermore, Lawrence and Nancy Rossow state:
An inquiry into the ability of high school students to perceive a religiously neutral
governmental act cannot be answered by considering only one or two aspects of
adolescent development; nor can the question be answered by considering all ad-
olescents as developmentally equal. The term adolescent is derived from the
Latin, meaning "to grow into maturity," and it reflects a transition period be-
tween childhood and adulthood.
Rossow & Rossow, supra note 8, at 213.
201... See Peer Cultures, supra note 139, at 192 (quoting a study that found that "suscepti-
bility to peer pressure and the degree of pressure adolescents actually perceived from
friends accounted for less than one half of the variance in self-reported peer involvement
and misconduct .... Even with measurement strategies that overstate peer influence, cor-
relations with individual behavior are not overwhelming").
202. Id.
203. B. Bradford Brown comments:
A common image seems to be that of adolescents enduring a constant and rather
overwhelming barrage of peer pressure to conform to group norms, with this
pressure serving to impede rather than assist personal growth. Yet, given the di-
verse and dynamic nature of peer groups and peer cultures, this image of steady
and uniformly negative pressure does not seem valid.
Id. at 190.
204. Id. at 193-94. See also, Clasen & Brown, supra note 4, at 465-67 (finding that
adolescents perceive more pressure toward positive activities such as school achievement
and peer socialization than destructive or antisocial behaviors); Paul A. Osterrieth, Adoles-
cence: Some Psychological Aspects, in ADOLESCENCE: PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 11,
18-19 (Gerald Caplan & Serge Lebovici eds., 1969). Paul Osterrieth states:
Lee v. Weisman
Ultimately, adolescent psychology cannot adequately support the hold-
ing in Lee, because there are significant differences in the susceptibility to
peer pressure of a ninth grader and of an eighteen year-old graduating
from high school. Because the adolescent is constantly changing and ma-
turing throughout high school, generalized statements of teen psychology
are not advisable. Teenagers of different ages, family backgrounds, and
gender are not all at the same level of development. Any constitutional
rule based on developing theories of adolescent psychology must take
this into account. Undoubtedly, further research in adolescent social and
cognitive psychology is essential before a constitutional rule of law can be
predicated on the basis of mere empirical findings. Perhaps it would have
been more jurisprudentially sound for the majority to base its holding on
Justice Blackmun's application of the Lemon test,20 5 or Justice Souter's
exposition of the historical development and understanding of the Estab-
lishment Clause. 2°
V. CONCLUSION
The use of psychological evidence in Lee v. Weisman displays both the
strengths and weaknesses of the use of social science evidence. As this
Note demonstrates, a true systematic evaluation of social science evi-
dence's authoritative weight is taxing and requires specific expertise and
guidance. With psychology there is a plethora of research concerned with
what the law inevitably must address: the norms of human behavior.
However, by failing to address some of the dynamic components of peer
pressure supported by the studies used, the majority presents only a cur-
sory and incomplete picture of adolescent behavior, and demonstrates an
unfortunate temptation to use such research to support general assump-
tions and not empirical conclusions. Thus, some system must be fol-
lowed, like the one suggested by Professors Monahan and Walker, to
evaluate the strength of social science data.
Scott Vaughn Carroll
But the seeking and the affirmation of self do not take place only in the frame-
work of opposition to and identification with the adult, or of sulky or happy soli-
tude. The group of peers is just as important, if not more so. Among his peers,
who are bothered by the same preoccupations as he is, the young person finds at
the same time a security and a stabilizing rivalry ....
Id.
205. See note 60 and accompanying text.
206. See note 61 and accompanying text.
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